

26 June 1951

1. In order to evaluate the "sincerity" of Communist truce "suggestions" in the Far East, one has only to compare their tactics with those used during the Civil War in China. Truce arrangements between the Communists and Nationalists were frequently signed. While negotiations went on, the Chinese Communist forces regrouped and strengthened their positions. Then, when the negotiations became deadlocked - as the Communists well knew they would - the red leaders ended the truce and hit again with renewed strength.

This is characteristic of the Communist technique of attrition. Since the Chinese Communists would never really quit before having reached their objectives, they cannot be expected to enter or sponsor negotiations for a truce or settlement without mental reservations. Doctrinally, the war in Korea is but an extension of a revolutionary movement which began in 1917 with the October Revolution in Russia. Mao himself stated that the "Chinese Revolution is part of the world revolution" and interpreted this as the "revolutionary thesis of Stalin on which the Chinese Communist built this (Mao's) correct thesis."

2. Communist concepts of time are stretchable. They are oriental rather than occidental. The Communists think in long terms. They realize that victories cannot be won easily and quickly and that there will be setbacks. In 1927, Stalin said: "Great revolutions never win through to the end on their first appearance. They grow and strengthen themselves by ebbs and flows. So it was everywhere and in Russia too. So it will be in China."

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Chinese Communist leaders are publicly committed to complete victory in Korea. In that they are backed by Stalin's statement, predicting such a victory. However, if Moscow and Peiping decide that a temporary retreat is necessary, demands for unqualified triumph would be modified. Negotiations for a truce would unquestionably constitute a retreat to be undertaken for good reasons. A settlement, if agreed upon, could still be extolled as a victory inasmuch as South Korean and UN forces have always been accused as having invaded N. Korea first. It would never be considered definite - except on Communist terms. In the mean time, a revision of Communist plans in the Far East would be undertaken, resultant organizational measures carried out and a very effective peace campaign carried to Western Europe with the objective of impeding rearmament and creating divisions between the US and their Western European allies, and within the US.

3. The cessation of organized hostilities in Korea would thus serve, from the Communist point of view, to advance the Communist program. It would therefore imply that hostilities be resumed whenever Moscow and Peiping deem the time opportune. It is quite possible that, in order to keep negotiations "fluid", the terms of the settlement would never be clearly defined in a form in which they might be rejected by the UN and thus end the truce sooner than the Communists desire. Moscow and Peiping surely realize that their previously cited terms are unacceptable to the US and if they consider negotiations at all, they must appear willing to compromise.

If indeed that is true, it can be concluded that the Chinese Communists are in need of respite. They might want to regain their

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balance and wait for the heavy equipment which they badly need. They have stated openly that they cannot win without it and have initiated a "fund raising" campaign to be carried through January, 1952, for such equipment.

4. There is another important factor which may possibly cause the Communists to retreat for a while. As a part of an overall revolutionary war, the Korean aggression is actually the first step toward the implementation of the Peiping WFTU program of November, 1949, which promulgated the strategy of Communist conquest in Asia and set up the organizational apparatus for its execution. This strategy envisaged measures of military action with the objective of setting up urban "proletarian" governments in countries which were deemed especially vulnerable, such as South Korea, Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaya. Priority was given to the conquest of Indochina and the "reorientation" of Thailand. Political rather than military aggression was mapped out for Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Japan.

Since in 1949, apparently, the Communists did not anticipate US-UN countermeasures in Korea, the Peiping plans may have been thrown out of gear. Thus it is conceivable that, in order to regain their balance and reconsider their strategy, the Communists feel in need of a breathing spell which UN forces will not permit them while hostilities are continuing.

5. Lastly there is the obvious point that the Kremlin may wish to eliminate, at this time, the danger that the Korean war develop into a world conflagration. If so, Peiping's compliance can be assumed as more or less automatic. For whatever modifications of Stalinist-Leninist Marxism Mao applied to China, as stated in his pamphlet "New Democracy",

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they would in no way limit his allegiance to Moscow whose help "to achieve final victory" he considered "indispensable" as far back as 1940. If the Kremlin should deem it necessary to demand a temporary retreat in the interest of the final success of world revolution, Mao would unquestionably sacrifice prestige and "face" until such time as new successes elsewhere may restore it.

#### CONCLUSION

Inasmuch as truce negotiations will be undertaken with mental reservations, the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders would permit the North Koreans to agree to such negotiations for reasons of opportunism only. Both the USSR and Red China would keep their hands free so as not to be bound "legally" if they feel that the time has come to end the retreat and attack again. Any possible loss of "face" will be compensated by gains of the Western European peace campaign and the resultant impediment of the work of NATO. Should negotiations break down, the West will be blamed and the reputation of the Communist powers as "peace loving" enhanced. Since neither Moscow nor Peiping will relinquish their designs of Communist world conquest, none of the agreements which might possibly be signed, can be looked upon as definite. Therefore, the attempt of coming to "terms" in Korea is partly a tactical device, partly a propaganda weapon, *of World Communism.*

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